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THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: DOES IT HAVE ENOUGH FORCE OF
LAW TO HOLD "STATES" PARTY TO THE WAR
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA LEGALLY
ACCOUNTABLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of World War II, the need to protect individual
human rights became apparent. The very magnitude of the Holocaust
atrocities forced the international community to realize the necessity for
a standard of human rights that would be recognized as "universal" in
nature.' The international community emphasized this desire during the
creation of the United Nations (U.N.) by prioritizing the establishment
of a list of basic human rights. In the U.N. Charter (Charter), the
drafters declared the U.N.'s purpose to be not only the maintenance of
peace and security, but also the promotion of respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.2 One problem with the Charter was that it
did not go further in its definition of those rights and freedoms. The
U.N., in 1947, gave the Commission on Human Rights (Commission)
the job of drafting an international bill of rights, to establish those
definitions .'
1. Jerome J. Shestack, The World Had a Dream: Forty Years Ago, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was Issued. A Look at What Happened Since, 15 HUM. RTS. 16, 16
(1988).
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. There are numerous references to human rights and freedoms
throughout the Charter, but Article 1 is the most important because it delineates a purpose of
the United Nations. The other references within the Charter are in support of Article 1.
3. Shestack, supra note 1, at 16. The Commission on Human Rights was established by
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) in February, 1946. Its purpose
was to submit "proposals, recommendations, and reports regarding:
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Before drafting could begin, there were questions of precisely
which rights were to be considered "universal" human rights. The
western countries concentrated more on the individual rights of people,
such as the freedoms of speech and religion; whereas, the countries
under Soviet control felt that rights such as the right to work and the
right to an education were more important.4 To reach common ground
and to ensure that these fundamental rights were indeed universal in
nature, all of these rights and freedoms were eventually considered
together in drafting the document.' By doing so, the enumerated rights
would more likely meet with the approval and support of the U.N.
General Assembly. The result would be a list of rights and freedoms
that reflected the feeling of the international community as a whole6 -
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration).'
However, when one considers the atrocities and violations of basic
human rights and freedoms taking place in Bosnia today,8 the horrors
of World War II, which the Declaration was designed to prevent, once
again come to mind. In the case currently before the International
(a) an international bill of rights;
(b) international declarations or conventions on civil liberties, the status of
women, freedom of information and similar matters;
(c) the protection of minorities;
(d) the prevention of discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language or
religion."
ROBERT E. ASHER ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROMOTION OF THE GENERAL WEL-
FARE 664 (1957) (quoting E.S.C. Res. 5(l), U.N. ESCOR, Ist Sess. (1946)). Its purpose was
expanded "with the addition of a fifth item, as follows:
(e) any other matter concerning human rights not covered by items (a), (b),
(c), and (d)."
Id. at 665 (quoting E.S.C. Res. 9(11), U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess. (1946)).
A drafting committee, consisting of Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the Sovi-
et Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, was created solely for the purpose of
working on an international bill of rights. Id. at 664-65.
4. Shestack, supra note I, at 16.
5. Id.
6. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 666.
7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. See also Shestack, supra note 1, at 16.
8. The current civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be linked to the end of World War I
when, in 1918, Bosnia joined what was then known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes; and the new Yugoslavia became a single region made up of a mixture of these ethnic
groups-Bosnia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Following World War II, Yugoslavia came
under communist leadership. In 1990, Bosnians voted their Communist leaders out of power.
Then in February of 1992, the Muslim and Croat majority in Bosnia voted to leave Yugosla-
via. In an effort to retain links with Serbia, the Bosnian Serb minority took up arms against the
Muslims and Croats attempting to create a "Greater Serbia." The civil war is estimated to have
left over 130,000 people killed or missing and over one million homeless as of May, 1993.
Hatred, Territory Feed Bosnian War, WINDSOR STAR (Canada), May 13, 1993, at Ft.
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Court of Justice (ICJ) dealing with this situation,9 several provisions of
the Declaration were cited as being violated by states who are party to
the conflict,'0 namely the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugosla-
via) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia-Herzegovina). Assuming that
these rights were thoughtfully considered and put into writing because
the international community wanted to guarantee that basic and funda-
mental rights would not be violated as they had been in the past," the
international community and the Declaration are being put to a test.
What is to be done about the horrors now taking place in Bosnia-
Herzegovina? Should not the rights guaranteed in the Declaration be
enforced?
This question is not easily answered since legal enforcement could
be a problem. When the Declaration was created, it was done so mere-
ly as a declaration and was not considered to have the force of law."
It was intended to be a guideline for individual states and regions to
follow in adopting their own legislation in defense of fundamental
human rights. 3 However, has such a wide recognition of the docu-
ment caused it to attain the status of customary international law 4
and, thus, become a legitimate source of law for judicial tribunals to
use in support of decisions and arguments? Or, is the document nothing
more than a statement of principles and recommendations with no
binding quality whatsoever? 5 This comment will discuss to what ex-
9. Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J.
325 (Provisional Measures Order of September 13) [hereinafter Bosnia Case]. The Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice in March of
1993 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They have alleged that Yugoslavia has not
only violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also that it has committed acts in
violation of the U.N. Charter and the Geneva conventions, as well as the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [herein-
after Genocide Convention]. These proceedings were instituted to obtain an order from the ICJ
to Yugoslavia to cease acts attributed to Bosnia-Herzegovina's allegations.
The Genocide Convention also addresses a specific area of human rights: the "intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group," ASHER ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 738 (quoting Genocide Convention); whereas, the Declaration is a much more
general document, and members of the U.N. sometimes pay more homage to the Declaration
than the Convention. Id. at 737-39.
10. Specifically, Bosnia-Herzegovina claims that Yugoslavia has violated, and continues to
violate, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
25, 26, and 28 of the Declaration. Bosnia Case, 1993 I.C.J. at 326.
11. See generally Shestack, supra note 1.
12. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS & THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVEN-
TURE 64 (1984).
13. Id.
14. E.g., KATHERINE C. HALL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A RESOURCE
GUIDE 9 (1993).
15. See generally PIETER N. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 32-38 (1951)
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tent the Declaration has achieved the status of enforceable law with
respect to the ICJ, and how it could play a role in holding individual
states liable for violations of its provisions in the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
II. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As a prerequisite to examining the enforceability of the Declaration
and how it is used by the International Court of Justice, it is necessary
to briefly discuss its history. This discussion will help with understand-
ing how and why it has reached the stage at which it is today.
When the drafting committee of the Commission began work on an
international bill of rights, three proposals were submitted to the Com-
mission for consideration. The proposals differed in one important
respect-their eventual legally binding character. The first proposal was
a draft declaration setting forth general principles and was not intended
to be binding by ratification. 6 The second proposal was a draft con-
vention that was intended to be binding on any state which ratified
it."' The third proposal dealt primarily with measures for implement-
ing human rights." The Commission was divided on which direction
to go, but in the end decided that the term "International Bill of
Rights" would embrace all three of the proposals as a group.' How-
ever, they chose to divide the group into two separate documents: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the proposed Covenant on
Human Rights' (Covenant).
The next question was which of these two documents would be
considered first. Because the proposed Covenant was intended to be a
convention with legally binding power and would require ratification
by states, some Commission members considered the Declaration to be
(arguing that the Declaration has no power or force of law whatsoever, and is just a statement
of what human rights should be in the eyes of the U.N.).
16. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 665.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 666.
20. The proposed Covenant on Human Rights eventually became two separate documents:
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976); and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976). Due to the expectation that these documents would be ratified and become
legally binding as such, the members of the U.N. disagreed radically on what should be includ-
ed in the documents based on their differing views on which types of rights were more im-
portant. Thus, the proposed single covenant became the two separate ones, each dealing with a
different area of rights, and each also containing much more limited and specific provisions
than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 677-79.
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less important. 2 This supported the Commission's desire to create an
express legal document to which every nation that ratified it would be
legally bound. The Declaration was nearly set aside as a secondary
project to the proposed Covenant. However, a majority of the Commis-
sion opted to allow work on the Declaration to begin immediately and
to postpone work on the proposed Covenant.22 The main reason for
this was that the Declaration, unlike the proposed Covenant, would not
require ratification. They felt that a document containing "declarations"
of rights that did not require ratification to pass the General Assembly
would be more easily and quickly passed through.23 This would then
satisfy the U.N.'s more pressing desire to quickly establish a basic
document of human rights.
This is not to say that the Commission had no hope of giving force
to the Declaration in addition to the proposed Covenant. To the con-
trary, the drafters of the Declaration had originally hoped that what
they put together would be legally binding from the start. 4 However,
they also knew that something needed to be done soon, even if it meant
that the result would merely be a declaration and not have immediate
legally binding effect. 5 Regardless of time constraints, the drafters
knew that the Declaration would be the most important part of the
International Bill of Rights.26 A "declaration" did not require rati-
fication, but would still have the approval of the U.N. behind it and
would express what the ideals and aspirations of all of the member
states were toward the rights of human beings in general.27 Thus, the
Commission decided to begin with the project of putting together the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
When the Commission began work on the Declaration, it was
forced to consider many issues in creating such a far reaching agree-
ment. It had to take into account differing political, religious, econom-
21. HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 64.
22. Id.
23. Id. Many feared that if the Declaration was adopted first, the Covenant would never be
adopted at all. This was the view of a small number of states, however, and ultimately the
Declaration was completed first. The Covenant, in fact, was not adopted and opened for signa-
ture until 1966, and it was another ten years before it took effect. The reasons for this were
mainly political, due to the atmosphere at the U.N. during the Cold War years. It would have
been twenty or more years before the Declaration would have been passed had the Commission
decided to postpone work on it until after the Covenant was completed. Id.
24. Id. John Humphrey, one of the drafters of the Declaration, stated that he knew that
"[the Declaration] was not meant to be legally binding," but that his instinct told him that
"eventually it would become part of international law whatever the intentions of its authors, or
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ic, social, and juridical ideas, as well as differing cultural patterns,
from each country then a member of the U.N.28 Virtually every coun-
try submitted suggestions of rights from their own constitutions and
national laws that they desired to see enunciated in the Declaration. 9
In the end, the Commission approved a draft of the Declaration con-
sisting of twenty-eight articles, narrowed down from the forty-eight
originally requested,30 with no votes against and only four states ab-
staining."j After consideration by the General Assembly, approximate-
ly eighty-six meetings worth of consideration and revision by the com-
mittee, and some debate by the Economic and Social Council,32 the
General Assembly officially adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights without objection by a vote of forty-eight for, zero
against, and only eight abstentions.3
III. THE DECLARATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
To give international human rights law legitimacy and force, there
must be a forum in which to bring disputes and enforce this law. Dif-
ferent forum courts exist on all levels, from individual state courts, to
regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights,34 all
the way up to the world court of the United Nations-the ICJ. All courts
can and do use international human rights documents like the Declara-
tion as authority for decision-making,35 but this paper will focus on
the decision-making of the ICJ and what sources of law it can use in
attempting to enforce basic human rights.
The ICJ frequently cites the Declaration as authority in its deci-
28. DROST, supra note 15, at 33; ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 666.
29. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 666-67.
30. Id. at 667-68.
31. Id. at 668. The vote in the Commission was 12 to 0, and Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the
Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia abstained. Id.
32. Id. at 668-69.
33. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 669. "Although the eight delegations that abstained
took strong exception to certain provisions in the Universal Declaration,... they apparently
did not wish to cast a negative vote on this occasion." Id.
34. The European Court of Human Rights is a regional court that was created by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, both of which were introduced in response to the horrors
of war in Europe in the 1930's and 1940's. The Court is vested with the function of ensuring
the observance of the Convention, and it is an independent judicial institution whose judgments
are final and binding. Rolv Ryssdal, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights,
Public Lecture at King's College, London (Mar. 22, 1990) (transcript available in University
of Tulsa College of Law Library).
35. Among those are federal courts of the United States. Although the courts make it clear
that it is not a convention that the United States is on its face legally bound to uphold, they do
concede that the Declaration has reached a point where it may be cited as a source of interna-
tional human rights law. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1980); see
also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-97 (D. Kan. 1980).
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sions, but what legal force does the Court give the Declaration? Can
the Court actually enforce its provisions on a state such as Yugoslavia
or Bosnia-Herzegovina? Before getting into that subject, it is necessary
to give a brief description of the ICJ as a judicial organ of the U.N.,
and of the general types of law the ICJ is allowed to use in its deci-
sion-making process.
A. ICJ as an Organ of the United Nations
The ICJ was established as the principal judicial organ of the
U.N.36 and replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice as
the principle court of world affairs." The ICJ is bound to function in
accordance with the Statute of the International Court of Justice (Stat-
ute).38 Also, as an organ of the U.N., the ICJ is bound to act in com-
pliance with the Charter and operates in furtherance of its goals, the
primary goal being the promotion of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 9
The security of such human rights and fundamental freedoms is
considered to be the "least visible" arm of the U.N., in which the ICJ
plays a large role." The Statute gives the ICJ jurisdiction over "all
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.""'
Therefore, the ICJ is given the power to preside over matters of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, provided the dispute is among
"states. 42
36. U.N. CHARTER arts. 7, 92.
37. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU) was created at the time of the
League of Nations. Upon the outbreak of World War II, the PCIJ was already very inactive,
and it held its last public sitting on December 4, 1939. With the creation of a new world politi-
cal organization, the U.N., consideration was also given to the creation of a new world court.
It was thought that since the PCIJ was linked to the League, which was in dissolution and was
considered a part of an old world order where European powers had dominated the affairs of
the international community, then a new court should be created where all nations could play
an influential role. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 16-18 (The Hague 1976).
One of the main differences between the two courts would be that the new International
Court of Justice would be directly linked to the new political body, whereas the PCU, although
created by the League of Nations, was not a part of the League. The ICJ would be the "princi-
ple judicial organ" of the U.N. Id.
38. U.N. CHARTER, art. 7; The Statute of the International Court of Justice, May, 1947
[hereinafter Statute].
39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
40. Bruce Russet, Timid Members Keep UN From Bold Action, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 1994,
at A23.
41. Statute, art. 36, para. 1.
42. Id. art. 34, para. 1.
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B. Sources of Law for the ICJ
Having established that the ICJ has the ability to decide disputes
among states concerning human rights violations, it is necessary to dis-
cuss which sources of law it can turn to in making these decisions.
Article 38 of the Statute sets out generally those sources of law the ICJ
shall apply in deciding international disputes.43 These include interna-
tional conventions, international custom, general principles of law
recognized by nations, and, as subsidiary means of determining rules
of law, judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified and respect-
ed individuals."
The first category, international conventions or treaties,45 is the
source of significant importance because it consists of documents ex-
pressly agreed to and signed by states and detail specifically the rules
of law that apply to the contesting states.46 The ICJ is concerned here
only with bilateral and multilateral contractual and law-making trea-
ties ,4 the most universal of which is the Charter of the United Na-
tions. Because they have been specifically ratified and accepted as
binding law by the states who are parties to them, treaties are consid-
ered more legally binding and effective than other sources of interna-
tional law. 4
However, when a court wishes to apply a treaty to a decision, one
of its restrictions is that the treaty is not binding on states who are not
signatories to the document.4 9 Therefore, the ICJ can only use treaties
43. Id. art. 38, para 1. The sources listed in Article 1, excluding the fourth since it states
itself that it is only "subsidiary" means, are not listed in any particular order of importance.
Conventions, international custom, and general principles of law are all considered potential
sources. id.
44. Id.
45. These are defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as international
agreements between states in written form and governed by international law. Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
46. Statute, art. 38, para. l(a).
47. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 287 (July 18)
'(dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in a discussion of the sources of law under Article 38 of
the Statute). The two countries initiating the action put forward allegations of contraventions of
the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa said to have been committed by South
Africa, the administering authority. The question in the case was to what extent South Africa
was obligated under the Mandate, if at all, if the Mandate is no longer in force. Id. at 17.
48. Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211,213 (1991).
49. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 534
(1993). This may not necessarily be true, however, if the treaty, or certain provisions of it,
have become part of customary international law or are recognized as generally accepted prin-
ciples of law. HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 73. Also, there is another type of treaty known as
a "legislative" treaty that by definition is one that purports to determine law and obligations
that would be incumbent upon other states that are not parties. DAVID OTT, PUBLIC INTERNA-
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as a source of law in specific cases rather than apply them as general
law to the international community as a whole. This is one of the
primary contentions used to dispute the legal force of the Declaration
since it has not been ratified, nor was it intended to be." However,
arguments exist that are contrary to this proposition, and will be dis-
cussed later in further detail.
The next two categories, international custom and general princi-
ples of law recognized by nations, are not as easily discernable since
there is no ratified document, and often no document at all, but only
"practice" by nations. These categories primarily consist of either
declarations of standards or beliefs that have been accepted or agreed
to by a majority of nations,5 or practices by nations that are common
to a majority of them and are recognized as such. 2 These two dif-
ferent sources are enumerated separately in the Statute, but are so
similar in their meanings that the distinction between them is becoming
less clear.53 The argument regarding the legal force of the Declaration
as customary international law is quite strong and will also be dis-
cussed later in more detail.
As for the final source of law allowed by the Statute, judicial
decisions of international tribunals are regarded merely as authoritative
evidence of the state of the law.' Even with regard to its own past
decisions, the ICJ was intended only to apply the law and not to make
it;5" therefore, precedence has no authoritative place in the decision-
making process of the ICJ. Judicial decisions are only persuasive and
are looked at merely as evidence of the current state of the law.56 The
same can be said of writings of publicists.
TIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 23-24 (1987). For example, the Charter of the United
Nations could be considered one such treaty. However, it could also be argued that it has only
reached that stage because it has become universally accepted "custom," and was not created
with the intent stated above of determining law and obligations that would bind states that did
not become parties.
50. See supra note 1 I and accompanying text.
51. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 291 (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka). Judge
Tanaka stated that as to the creation of customary international law, the consent of all states is
not required. If Article 38, paragraph l(b), of the Statute were meant to allow the contrary
view of a particular State or States to prevent the creation of customary law, then it would re-
sult in the permission of obstruction by veto, and this could not have been the intent of the
drafters of Article 38. Id.
52. Id. A general practice is "the result of the repetition of individual acts of States consti-
tuting consensus in regard to a certain content of a rule of law. Such repetition of acts is an
historical process extending over a long period of time." id.
53. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
88-89 (1989).
54. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2d ed. 1973).
55. Id. at 20.
56. Id. at 25.
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Therefore, the Declaration must fall under two possible sources of
law allowed by the Statute if it is to have binding effect for the ICJ. It
must be either a treaty or international customary law.
C. The Declaration as a Source of Law
The first argument in support of using the Declaration as a source
of law in international human rights decision-making is that it is an
extension of the Charter and, therefore, to be treated as a convention
with binding effect on the member states of the U.N. The second, and
stronger, argument is that the Declaration and what it embodies has
reached the status of customary international law and is equally binding
as a source of international human rights law.
1. As an Extension of the Charter
One argument supporting the proposition that the Declaration is
legally binding is that the declaration is essentially an extension of the
Charter and, thus, has the same authority. Article I of the Charter
states clearly that one of the main purposes of the U.N. involves "pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion. '"" Although these distinctions are mentioned generally, the
Charter does not elaborate on specific rights and freedoms in these
areas.58 Because such emphasis has been placed on rights and free-
doms by the U.N. without defining them in the Charter, it has been
argued that the Declaration constitutes an extension of the Charter by
outlining and specifying what rights and freedoms are to be promot-
ed.59 It sets out in detail one of the principal aims of the U.N.'
The preamble to the Declaration declares that "Member States
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
58. In addition to article 1, the promotion of rights and freedoms is mentioned a number of
times throughout the Charter:
(a) article 13, paragraph (b) under chapter IV setting out the General As-
sembly,
(b) article 55, paragraph (c) under chapter IX discussing international eco-
nomic and social co-operation,
(c) article 62, paragraph 2 under chapter X setting up the Economic and
Social Council, and
(d) article 76, paragraph (c) under chapter XII setting up the international
trusteeship system.
However, these also do not go into any specifics about what rights and freedoms are involved.
See generally U.N. CHARTER.
59. DROST, supra note 15, at 32-33.
60. Id. at 33. "It elaborates on the Charter and gives a definition of substance. It expresses
the spirit of the Charter by setting out in detail what in the Charter itself was already included
as one of the principal aims and purposes of the United Nations." Id.
[Vol. 3:141
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have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms."'" It also declares that
"common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
importance for the full realization of this pledge."62 These two phras-
es read together have been interpreted to make the Declaration, togeth-
er with the Charter, a source of international law.63 Article 56 of the
Charter, in conjunction with Article 55, created a "pledge," or a legal
obligation, on the part of the Member States to achieve the goals of
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental free-
doms. 4 And, as stated earlier, the Charter does not clarify these
rights and freedoms. It is the Declaration that does this. The proposi-
tion is, then, that the Declaration refers back to the Charter,65 and
thus the Member States have expressly accepted the obligations set
forth in the Declaration.
66
The General Assembly itself considers the Declaration to be the
"law of the United Nations. ' '67 Even John Humphrey, one of the
drafters of the Declaration, intended that it "would apply to all states
and would have the great authority of the United Nations behind it."8
During the General Assembly debates preliminary to the approval
and adoption of the Declaration, a number of states voiced their belief
that those who signed the Charter would be bound by the Declaration
"as if they had signed a convention embodying those principles."'69
China asserted that the Declaration "explicitly" stated the rights alluded
to in the Charter.7" France considered it "an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the Charter." 7' Chile stated that a violation of the Declaration
would be a violation of the Charter.72
The ICJ has also elaborated slightly on the argument that the Dec-
laration is an extension of the Charter. It declared that the Charter's af-
firmation of faith in fundamental human rights is "taken further" in the
Declaration.73 This could indicate that the ICJ is using the Declaration
6 1. Universal Declaration, supra note 7, at pmbl.
62. Id.
63. JOHN CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 12-13 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., Procedural Aspects of International Law Series, 1970).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c, art. 56.
65. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53-54 (1983).
66. Id. at 54.
67. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (Ian Brownlie ed., 2d ed. 1981).
68. HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 64.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 73-4.
73. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
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to clarify the Charter.
The ICJ has also, in numerous opinions involving human rights
issues, including the one at issue concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina,
invoked the Charter and the Declaration together.7" In its application
to the Court, Bosnia requested the ICJ to declare that Yugoslavia had
violated nearly every provision of the Declaration75 and Article 1(3)
of the Charter.76 This invocation of the Charter and the Declaration
together lends strength to the argument that the Court may view them
as dependent upon each other. In its order granting preliminary mea-
sures at the request of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Court invoked "the rights of the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
life, liberty, security, and bodily and mental integrity, as well as the
other basic human rights specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights"77 as "legal rights" to be protected.7" The ICJ clearly
used the Declaration as a basis for making its determination.
To summarize, Article 1 of the Charter essentially provides the
basis for the promotion of human rights and the authority for the U.N.
to act on them. The Declaration provides a detailed list and explana-
tions of those rights declared to be "human rights." In this respect, the
Declaration is essentially the explanation of Article 1, and could there-
fore have the same authority for the U.N. to act upon as the Charter
itself. If this argument is valid, then the ICJ would have authority to
use the Declaration, in conjunction with the Charter, as a source of
binding international law under Article 38(l)(a) of the Statute as an
international convention.
2. As Law of International Custom
An even stronger argument as to what force the Declaration should
be given by the ICJ is that it is now a part of customary international
law.79 Violations of certain human rights are violations of internation-
al law if those rights have achieved the status of customary law."0
Customary international law is defined generally as resulting "from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 291 (July 12).
74. See, e.g., South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 293,
468 (July 18).
75. Bosnia Case, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 325-26 (Provisional Measures Order of Sept. 13).
76. Id. at 326-27.
77. Id. at 343.
78. Id.
79. See generally Charney, supra note 49, at 536-42 (discussing thoroughly customary law
and its many rules regarding acceptance by states, exemptions, rules of acquiescence, and
many other topics).
80. HALL, supra note 14, at 53.
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sense of legal obligation."'" The Statute of the International Court of
Justice defines international custom "as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law."82 The ICJ elaborated on this by requiring that the
rule invoked "is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage
practiced by the States in question," 3 and that "[n]ot only must the
acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such,
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requir-
ing it. "8
Given that the Declaration has not yet been fully accepted in its
entirety by some states, it is significant that if established as customary
international law, the Declaration would be binding on all states, not
just those who recognize it as such." As long as the international
"community" has accepted the principle as customary, it does not
matter if every state individually has accepted the particular princi-
ple. 6 As to how long it takes before a norm is considered to become
customary, there is no set rule. This development may happen quickly
or over a period of time, 7 but obviously the longer its development,
the stronger it appears.
Essentially, the development of customary international law can be
divided into four factors, or prerequisites:88 generality of practice, 9
uniformity of practice,' opinio juris, 9 and the duration of develop-
ment.92 These factors are not written down in legal form, so strict
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987).
82. Statute, art. 38, para. l(b).
83. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20). This case involved a dis-
pute between the two countries that arose following a request by the Columbian embassy in
Lima, Peru for the safe delivery of a Peruvian national who was requesting asylum in Colum-
bia. The dispute was over how to interpret an agreement between the two countries concerning
asylum. Id. at 272-74.
84. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44
(Feb. 20). The case concerned the delimitation of the boundaries of the continental shelf be-
neath the North Sea. An agreement could not be reached between the parties, and the question
was submitted to the ICJ to determine which principles and rules of law were applicable. Id. at
17-28.
85. MERON, supra note 53, at 3; see also HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 73.
86. Charney, supra note 49, at 536.
87. Id.
88. Gunning, supra note 48, at 214.
89. "This relates to whether a practice is fairly widespread among a majority of states" in
differing regions of the world, as opposed to a minority of states or just one area of the world.
OTr, supra note 49, at 16.
90. This means that "the practice of states should not vary greatly from state to state." Id.
91. This means that the practice arises out of a legal obligation to do so, as opposed to a
political or moral obligation. Id. at 15.
92. This is obviously "the length of time a practice has been followed" in the manners set
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adherence to one or all is not absolutely required. However, because
they are considered the general prerequisites for the establishment of
customary international law, this comment will discuss them all for the
purposes of examining the Declaration.
The first prerequisite is generality of practice. When the Declara-
tion was initially adopted by the General Assembly, forty-eight states
voted in favor of it and none against it, with only eight states abstain-
ing." The Declaration has also been invoked in numerous Security
Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, other international
tribunal opinions, international treaties, and national constitutions.94
Most importantly, it has been invoked by the ICJ, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section. It has even been invoked in
treaties signed by states who abstained in its original vote of approv-
al.95 Significant, too, are the thousands of instances per year when the
Declaration is invoked by individuals who contact the U.N. with claims
of human rights violations. All of these instances indicate that state
practice of invoking, and thus adhering to (technically, if not practical-
ly), the Declaration has risen to the level of general state practice.
This blends with the second prerequisite of uniformity. By invok-
ing the Declaration as it is written, either by specific provision or by
general statements such as "in accordance with the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights," '97 indicates that state practice of adhering to
the principles as they are set out in the Declaration has been uniform in
nature. Thus, the number of times and the manner in which the Decla-
ration has been invoked is strong evidence of the practice of states
demonstrating international assent sufficient to argue that its practice is
both general and uniform in nature. 98
In considering the third prerequisite of opinio juris, the reasons for
out above by states. Id. at 15-16.
93. ASHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 669.
94. HALL, supra note 14, at 9; HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 75. Since the Declaration's
adoption, at least eighteen countries have incorporated it into their constitutions. David A.
Catania, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Sodomy Laws: A Federal Common
Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals Based on Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM,
L. REV. 289, 301 (1994) (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 n,10 (2d Cir.
1980)).
95. The Declaration was invoked in article 7 of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 1960. All of
the abstaining countries in the 1948 vote of approval for the Declaration voted in favor of the
above document, except for South Africa. HUMPHREY, supra note 12, at 75.
96. Id. at 76-77.
97. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note
20, at pmbl.; see also, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
20, at pmbl.
98. Catania, supra note 94, at 301-02.
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adhering to the Declaration's principles, as well as the forms in which
it is used (constitutions, treaties, court briefs and opinions, etc.), may
demonstrate that it is invoked out of a "legal" obligation to do so.
However, this is a very difficult factor to consider, and is criticized for
being nearly impossible to determine."
The final prerequisite, duration, is also not strictly adhered to.
There is no set length of duration required before a practice becomes
international custom." The ICJ has stated that even a short duration
could be sufficient if the practice has been extensive and virtually uni-
form.'' In the case of the Declaration, it has been in effect since
1948 and has been invoked consistently since then, as pointed out
previously. Therefore, the duration of its development arguably satis-
fies this prerequisite.
Considering these factors, then, the Declaration has arguably
reached a point of being customary international law. Assuming this
argument to be valid, the ICJ would have authority to use the Declara-
tion as a source of binding international law under Article 38(l)(b) of
the Statute.
D. Applications of the ICJ
Before making this conclusion and determining that the ICJ can
effectively enforce the Declaration against Yugoslavia and/or Bosnia-
Herzegovina based on principles of international law, we must first
consider what the ICJ has done with regard to the treatment of the
Declaration in the past. Although the ICJ is not obligated to follow pre-
cedent, it is nonetheless important to consider the Court's reasoning in
other cases, in order to determine the directions it has taken and how it
is likely to act in the future.
The ICJ has on numerous occasions cited the Declaration in its
opinions and decisions as a source of authority in the area of human
rights. °" It is interesting to note how the degree of authority that the
ICJ has given the Declaration has gradually changed over the years
since its.adoption. The ICJ has never publicly announced that the
Declaration is a legally binding instrument. Quite the contrary, in the
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. In order to determine whether a state is
doing something out of a legal obligation to do so, one must decide if it is "conscious" of its
duty to do so. O'rT, supra note 49, at 15. This theory is criticized because it requires consider-
ation of an essentially psychological viewpoint. Id. Can a state have a psychological viewpoint
as if it were a real person?
100. Ornr, supra note 49, at 15-16.
101. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43
(Feb. 20).
102. See infra notes 104-121 and accompanying text.
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South West Africa case of 1966,"03 the court held that
"[h]umanitarian considerations may constitute the inspirational basis for
rules of law,"' 1 but they do not themselves constitute sufficient ex-
pression in legal form "[amounting] to rules of law" such that the ICJ
can use them in rendering decisions. 1"5 In his dissenting opinion,
however, Judge Tanaka went into an examination of the sources of law
enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute." He concluded that although
the Declaration "is no more than a declaration adopted by the General
Assembly and not a treaty binding on the member States,' 0 7 as to the
area of customary international law, the Declaration does constitute
evidence of the application of the human rights provisions of the Char-
ter.' Therefore, it was Judge Tanaka's belief that the rules outlined
in the Declaration have become rules of customary international
law. 109
Five years later, in Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Legal Consequences), anoth-
er phase of the case dealing with South West Africa, the ICJ used the
Declaration as one of three main sources of law in rendering its opin-
ion." 0 While the two main sources were South Africa's Mandate for
Namibia, which was the document at issue, and the Charter of the
U.N., they cited the Declaration as a third important document and
source of international law."' In discussing the General Assembly's
revocation of the Mandate, the Court stated that the revocation was
103. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.CJ. 6 (July 18).
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id. The Court rejected the suggestions that humanitarian considerations in and of them-
selves are sufficient to be used as rules of law, and took a very strict view of what constitutes
"rules of law" in the international arena. Id. It is important to consider that the year was 1966,
and the Declaration had only been in effect for 18 years. Up to this point, it had only been
mentioned in I.C.J. opinions twice: first in the Asylum Case and then in the Nottebohm Case.
Both times, it was only mentioned as a reference to specific rights of individuals in dissenting
opinions. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 290 (Nov. 20); Nottebohm (Liech. v.
Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 63-64 (Apr. 6). This case concerned a German national who lived in
Guatemala. After Germany invaded Poland, he applied for and received citizenship in Liech-
tenstein. He was later deported from Guatemala and interned in the United States as an enemy
alien. After the war, Guatemala would not let him back. Liechtenstein brought this action
against Guatemala on his behalf for abuses of his human rights. Id. at 16.
106. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 287.
107. Id. at 288.
108. Id. at 293.
109. Id.
110. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June
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explicitly based on three grounds relating to "international instruments
of the first importance," 1 ' referring to the three instruments men-
tioned above. The General Assembly thus determined that the Decla-
ration was authoritative in providing a basis for its decision.
As an organ of the U.N., it was then up to the ICJ to determine,
one way or the other, this same issue."' In discussing the "evolution
of modern international law which is taking place in the United Nations
through the implementation and the extension to the whole world of the
principles of equality, liberty and peace in justice which are embodied
in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,""1
4
the Court said it could not omit consideration of the Declaration as a
ground for the Mandate's termination."' And, by referring to the
Declaration, the ICJ "has asserted the imperative character of. . . the
human rights whose violation by the South African authorities it has
denounced."" 6
The ICJ further stated in this case that the Declaration is not bind-
ing as a treaty under Article 38, paragraph 1(a)." 7 However, it said
that the Declaration is binding on States on the basis of custom, either
because it constitutes a codification of customary law, or because it has
acquired the force of custom through a general practice accepted as
law." 8 So, within the five years between the two cases dealing with
South West Africa, the ICJ's view of the Declaration developed into its
use as an authoritative source of international law.
As time progressed and the importance and respect for human
rights increased, the number and frequency of cases increased where
the ICJ cited the Declaration as competent authority in support of an
argument." 9 By 1987, the ICJ was looking upon the Declaration as a
document containing basic principles of law, 20 and concrete expres-
112. Id.
113. Id. at 71-72.
114. Id. at 72.
115. Id. at 71.
116. Id. at 72.
117. Id. at 76.
118. Id.
119. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
120. Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18, 173 (May 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Evensen making conclud-
ing observations on nationals in general changing citizenship). This case concerned a Soviet
national who was a staff member of the U.N. working under a fixed term contract. Before it
expired, he requested asylum in the United States. He applied for continued employment with
the U.N. in a "career" capacity. He was denied due to a judgement by the U.N. Administra-
tive Tribunal, which deals with personnel at the U.N., determining that there was a legal im-
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sions of established principles of human rights in the modem law of
nations. 2' Thus, the ICJ has consistently increased its use of the
Declaration as a source of law in supporting its decisions. Can this
trend be expected to continue into the near future should the ICJ be
faced with attempting to enforce the Declaration against Yugoslavia or
Bosnia-Herzegovina?
IV. FUTURE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECLARATION
For enforcement to be possible, a "state" member of the U.N.
would have to initiate proceedings against another "state" member.
This is the only way the ICJ can assert jurisdiction since it has none
over individuals.12 In an attempt to prosecute "individuals" responsi-
ble for violations of human rights in Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council
set up an international war crimes tribunal,' the first of its kind
since the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals following World War
11.124
This is an important and aggressive step toward upholding basic
human rights, but what of the responsibility of the states involved?
Much of the war effort on the part of the Bosnian Serbs has been, and
continues to be, supported and controlled by Yugoslavia. And, similar-
ly, the Bosnian Army is the state army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus,
the two states should be held accountable for their actions in conduct-
ing a war where human rights are disregarded.
pediment of necessary approval by the Soviet government of the extension of his contract. This
application for review deals with reviewing that judgment. Id. at 20-26.
121. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177, 211 (Dec. 15) (separate opinion of Judge
Evensen). This case concerned a disagreement between Romania and the U.N. on the applica-
bility of a provision of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
a document dealing with staff members of the U.N. A Rumanian national was the designated
rapporteur of the Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities and was to issue a report to the Sub Commission on a given topic. He reportedly
fell ill and was unable to complete his report on time. During the time of his "illness," the
Rumanian government would not allow anyone from the U.N. to see him. The dispute arose as
to the status of the man under the above Convention when he is in his own country; i.e. wheth-
er he has any rights under the Convention. Id. at 179-87.
122. Statute, art. 34, paral.
123. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25626 (1993).
124. With the signing of the London Charter, the act by which the Allied powers of World
War It provided for the establishment of a tribunal for the punishment of major war criminals,
the first international tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes was created. Like this tribunal,
the one established by the Security Council for crimes in the war in Bosnia will likely have a
major effect on international human rights law as it relates to individual applications. SECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVIA 5-8 (1993).
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If the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide continues to a
point of attempted enforcement of a judgment against one or both of
the states, then it would be possible to use the Declaration as a legiti-
mate source of law in support of such a judgment. Enforcing the
Genocide Convention would obviously be highly beneficial itself; but
what of all the other human rights abuses not directly addressed by the
Convention? It would be necessary to use the Declaration as a basis for
judgments involving these other types of abuses.
The ICJ has gone from being in a position not quite ready to de-
clare the Declaration as having some force of international law 5 to a
position of feeling comfortable enough to consistently cite the Declara-
tion as a source of international law as it pertained to a specific
case. '2 Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion in the South West Africa
case of 1966"' became the court's opinion by the time of the Legal
Consequences case." 8 The ICJ was showing signs of recognizing the
Declaration as international law. This became more and more evident
in later years, as the ICJ began citing the Declaration consistently in
human rights cases. This is the main human rights document cited most
often by the ICJ in its opinions and judgments in matters of human
rights or fundamental freedoms.
What type of international law the ICJ considers the Declaration
can be argued differently. Most scholars will argue that it is recognized
as customary international law, simply from the fact that it is cited so
often by the ICJ and invoked so often in legally binding treaties and
constitutions.'29 It has existed for over forty years and is more recog-
nized as a basic list of human rights than ever before. By the manner
in which states invoke the Declaration, either in treaties, in national
instruments, or in other international documents, it is evident that the
majority, if not all, states treat the document as a legal norm. When
the ICJ takes all of this into account, it can only come up with the con-
clusion that the Declaration is now a part of customary international
law.
If the trend continues, future decisions by the ICJ will treat the
Declaration as legally binding on all states. The document will be con-
sidered a direct source of international law allowed under Article 38 of
the Statute. Essentially, the ICJ will have no option but to use the
Declaration as binding law, because once it has begun recognizing it as
125. See supra text accompanying note 105.
126. See supra text accompanying notes I 10- 11.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18.
129. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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binding law, it must continue in that regard unless its provisions are
nullified by a subsequent rule of international law stating otherwise.
This, however, is unlikely in the view of the international community
today. The Declaration is considered to be the embodiment of basic
and inalienable human rights. These are not likely to be easily changed
by any state or tribunal such as the ICJ.
In considering the case concerning Bosnia, the ICJ has already
declared to both sides to the dispute that certain rights are guaranteed
by the Declaration. Aside from the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the ICJ based its preliminary
order on the Declaration as a legally binding international instrument.
If it continues in this manner with respect to future proceedings on this
case, it will necessarily base its final judgment, at least in part, on the
Declaration, along with the above mentioned Convention. Even if the
Convention did not exist as a source of law for the specific area of
genocide, the ICJ would be legally able to cite the Declaration as legal
authority in making its judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Declaration, although adopted without the intent of being a
legally binding instrument, has achieved the status of international law.
It embodies basic human rights and freedoms that are inalienable and
are themselves considered general principles of law. The document was
created in furtherance of the purposes of the United Nations in promot-
ing human rights and fundamental freedoms, and has since become part
of the general practice of individual states and the international com-
munity as a whole. In this respect, it is now a part of customary inter-
national law and will remain so until the international community
determines otherwise. States, not just individuals, must abide by the
rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration and should be held ac-
countable for violation of such rights and freedoms. In this way alone
can the meaning of the Declaration and the desire of the international
community be legitimized.
Scott L. Porter
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